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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. 
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, : Case No, 20670 
Defendant/Appellant : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of Issues and Statement of the Case are 
as set forth previously in Appellant's Brief. The Appellant 
takes this opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's 
Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
THE STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF PRETRIAL STATE-
MENTS MADE BY TWO KEY WITNESSES AND THE 
SURPRISE CALLING OF THOSE WITNESSES VIOLATED 
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In its response brief, the State contends that the 
defendant, Johnnie Knight, received the appropriate remedy for 
surprise testimony — namely that the court adjourned late in 
the afternoon and defense counsel had one evening to prepare 
for the remainder of Georgia and Walt Moore's testimony. This 
was an utterly inadequate "remedy". Defense counsel had 
requested that Walt Moore not be allowed to testify because his 
prior statements had not been provided to her and she, 
therefore, was unprepared to cross-examine Mr. Moore and the 
surprise had substantially prejudiced Mr. Knight's defense. 
This motion was denied (T. II at 11). Defense counsel then 
made a motion to continue the trial for a few hours so that she 
could discuss the new evidence with her client and prepare to 
meet it. Again, Judge Dee summarily denied the motion (T. II 
at 11-12). Finally, defense counsel made a motion to withdraw 
as counsel because she was unprepared for the surprise 
testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore (T. II at 12). This motion 
was also denied (Id.). The State's contention that defense 
counsel did not seek all possible remedies before requesting a 
mistrial is without merit. Similarly, the State's bold 
contention that the defendant's requested continuance was 
merely for the purpose of renegotiating a plea bargain is 
without any substantiation in the record, and such speculation 
was improper. Indeed, it is clear from the record that Judge 
Dee made no attempt to remedy the surprise in this case, even 
though the prosecution had no objection to the defendant's 
motion to continue. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) is the most 
recent treatment of prosecutorial non-disclosure. In an 
opinion issued after completion of Appellant's brief, the Court 
considered a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial because 
information was withheld by the prosecution. In affirming the 
conviction the court concluded that the withheld information 
had no impact on the outcome of the case. However, writing for 
the Court, Justice Stewart cautioned that the compelling 
reasons which require the prosecutor's disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence also apply to requested inculpatory 
evidence, and that non-compliance that misleads the defendant 
may be prejudicial error. 
As we have several times noted, a 
criminal proceeding is more than an 
adversarial contest between two 
competing sides. It is a search for 
truth upon which a just judgment may 
be predicated. Procedural rules are 
designed to promote that objective 
not frustrate it. When a request or 
an order for discovery is made 
pursuant to §77-35-16(a), a pros-
ecutor must comply. To meet basic 
standards of fairness and to ensure 
that a trial is a real quest for truth 
and not simply a contest between the 
parties to win, a defendant's request 
for information which has been vol-
untarily complied with, or a court 
order of discovery must be deemed to 
be deemed a continuing request. And 
even though there is no court-ordered 
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure 
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory 
information which falls with the ambit 
of §77-35-16(a), after the prosecution 
has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence might so mislead defendant 
as to cause prejudicial error. 
In the case at bar, the State maintains that the 
surprise testimony of Walt Moore and Georgia Moore did not 
compromise Mr. Knight's right to a fair trial and suggest that 
the Moores1 testimony was and analogous in nature to the 
challenged testimony in Carter (Resp. Brief p.8). Even a brief 
examination of the evidence presented demonstrates the 
absurdity of this argument and the dissimilarity of the Carter 
testimony from the Moores1 testimony. The case against Mr. 
Knight which his attorney was expecting and for which she was 
prepared, (i.e., excluding the surprise testimony) did not 
include the Moores as the State had not provided their 
addresses nor their statements and had indicated the week 
before the trial that the Moores' whereabouts were unknown. It 
was expected by the defendant that there would be testimony 
that Mr. Knight's wallet was found in the trunk of the car 
identified as having been used in the robbery. The wallet was 
scattered among items left in the trunk from a past hunting 
trip. It was also known that the State's principal witness 
would be Jeff Richens, who would identify Mr. Knight, as well 
as his codefendant, Mr. Ridlon, as having taken part in the 
robbery. For the defense, the focus of the trial would be on 
the credibility of Jeff Richens. 
The result of the surprise testimony was twofold. 
First, Georgia Moore indicated that she had initially 
fabricated an alibi for Mr. Knight at his urging. Her 
testimony fully recanted the alibi. Secondly, Walt Moore 
placed Mr. Knight at a convenience store with Jeff Richens (the 
admitted robber) shortly after the robbery and included 
testimony that the three of them drove past what proved to be 
the abandoned get-away car. 
The jury convicted the defendant, Johnnie Knight, 
based on this surprise testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore. 
They disregarded the testimony of the State's eyewitness and 
co-conspirator, Jeff Richens, apparent from their acquittal of 
the co-defendant, Joseph Ridlon. Richens1 testimony fully 
incriminated Ridlon in the robbery, yet the jury released Mr. 
Ridlon, who was not mentioned in the Moores1 testimony. 
Clearly, then, the State's argument that the twofold impact of 
the surprise testimony was non-prejudicial is without merit. 
Similarly, the State's apparent urging that the Carter 
holding be limited to surprise inculpatory testimony of an 
eyewitness is illogical and unresponsible. Many convictions 
are obtained without eyewitness identifications. Other forms 
of evidence can be relied upon as a basis for conviction, and 
eyewitness identifications or accomplice testimony might be 
disregarded for lack of credibility by the jury, as in the case 
at bar. The defendant's right to a fair trial can be 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's withholding of inculpatory 
evidence which falls in the ambit of §77-35-16, whether that 
evidence is from an eyewitness or not. 
The State also misconstrues the Appellant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument. The Appellant 
claims that the State denied him effective assistance of 
counsel both in the plea process and at trial. The State 
merely addressed the former (plea process) argument. 
Mr. Knight does not contend that he has a 
constitutional right to a plea bargain. Indeed, as the State 
points out, the prosecution is under no constitutional 
obligation to offer a defendant a plea bargain. State v. 
Geary, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Sept. 26, 1985). But, the two 
U.S. Supreme cases cited by the Appellant, North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U S. 25 (1970), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357 (1978), stand for the proposition that if a State 
chooses to offer a defendant a plea bargain, the plea bargain 
process is only constitutional to the extent that it complies 
with the due process requirements, including competent 
counsel. Mr. Knight contends that while the initial decision 
whether to offer him a plea was discretionary on the part of 
the procecutor, once the prosecutor decided to offer him the 
plea to a third degree attempted robbery, the constitutional 
requirements of due process attached, including the right to 
competent counsel. Uniformed, misled counsel cannot be 
effective counsel. The State in the case at bar, whether 
purposely or not, deceived defense counsel into thinking that 
she had a substantially stronger defense than she did. This 
misguidance violated Mr. Knight's due process right to 
competent counsel in the plea process, in violation of the due 
process plea standard of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
The Appellant also contends that the prosecutor's 
non-disclosure rendered defense counsel unable to meet the 
evidence at trial and unable to formulate a defense. As stated 
earlier, the surprise at trial was substantial and 
prejudicial. The overnight recess before the Moores' testimony 
allowed enough time for the defense to plan a rudimentary 
impeachment of the Moores. But there was not sufficient time 
for any independent investigation of the Moores, much less to 
plan any meaningful defense. 
To summarize, the prosecutor's non-disclosure of 
statements which he had volunteered to disclose violated both 
the Appellant's right to a fair trial nad right to effective 
assistance of counsel. The surprise testimony of Walt and 
Georgia Moore was substantial and highly prejudicial; yet the 
trial court did nothing to remedy the situation. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to exclude the testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore or 
refusing to grant Mr. Knight's motion for mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, 
Johnnie P. Knight, asked this Court to reverse his conviction 
and grant him a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this P 7 clay of February, 1986. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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